Nov 14, 1986

GNG AGREES ON "WORKING PROGRAMME" FOR ITS TASKS.

GENEVA, NOVEMBER 12 (IFDA/CHAKRAVARTHI RAGHAVAN)— The Group of Negotiations on Goods (GNG) in GATT agreed on Monday to what is described as "working programme" and calendar of meetings that would enable it to carry out its role under the Punta del Este declaration, and get the process of negotiations on goods on track.

The GNG, chaired by the GATT Director-General, which had held a meeting on November 7, met again today and after prolonged discussions agreed on these procedural decisions.

Participants at the meeting said that these decisions should enable the GNG to elaborate detailed trade negotiating plans (which it has to be do by December 19) and designate the mechanism for multilateral surveillance of the commitments to standstill an rollback, in effect since September 20.

The decisions Monday envisage this, and the establishment of the first set of negotiating groups, by December 16.

GATT sources said the procedural decisions to get the process of negotiations on track had involved some difficult negotiations over the last few weeks, largely because some parts of the Punta del Este declaration lacked clarity, particularly in the relationships and responsibilities of the Trade Negotiating Committee (TNC) and the GNG under the Ministerial declaration.

The Ministerial declaration launching the Uruguay round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTNS) has named three bodies – the Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) to carry out the Uruguay round, and functioning under it, the GNG to carry out the negotiations in goods and the Group on Dervices (GNS) to carry out the negotiations on services outside the GATT.

GATT sources said some people had come away from Punta del Este with the idea that all that had to be done was to set up negotiating groups and appoint their chairmen, and that each negotiating group would then formulate its own negotiating plans and begin negotiations, reporting to the GNG at the end.

Those like U.S. who favoured this view quickly found that it was not so simple, and that the GNG had to designate the surveillance mechanism, and prepare and put into effect detailed negotiating plans prior December 19, and set up the negotiating groups according to complicated criteria set out in the declaration.

GATT sources stressed that it was clear that the GNG was not intended merely to set a calendar of meetings and be a post-office between the negotiating groups and the TNC (as the U.S. has tried to make it), but had a more central role of coordinating the work and the negotiating groups, supervise the progress of negotiations, and decide on inclusion of additional subject matters in the negotiations.

The decision of the GATT CPS at Punta del Este on the commitment for standstill and rollback, and multilateral surveillance of its implementation, asked the TNC "to decide" on the appropriate mechanism to carry out the surveillance, including periodic reviews and evaluations’.

At the same time, the decision also asked the GNG "to designate" the appropriate mechanism for surveillance.

This apparent dual responsibility, GATT participants privately admit, was due to confusion of the last minute compromise over the separate negotiations on goods and services, each under its own supervisory body, with the TNC as an overall supervisory body over the two tracks.

In this process and by oversight, the original intention to have the TNC to deal with surveillance of standstill and rollback (when only one body was envisaged) had remained in the text of the declaration, instead of this role being fully put under the GNG.

The U.S. side had tried to take advantage of this in an effort to keep the role of the GNG to a minimum, and place the surveillance mechanism only under the TNC which would meet very occasionally, and thus avoid close scrutiny of standstill and rollback commitments and their implementation.

Third world countries, as also a number of industrial nations, on the other hand have emphasised the importance of the standstill and rollback commitments and the multilateral surveillance.

All these countries, in agreeing to the procedures for further work in the GNG, are reported to have underscored Monday the importance they attached to the multilateral surveillance mechanism on standstill and rollback.

In regard to the negotiating plan, and the functioning of the negotiating groups, third world countries and the industrial nations with small delegations, also want to avoid a repetition of the Tokyo round experience.

At that time, there were negotiating groups set up; some chaired by GATT officials and others by country representatives, and virtually functioning independently.

And within them, the three major trading blocs (U.S., EEC and Japan) did their own negotiations, and ultimately presented their agreements to others on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis.

At least this time, many of the smaller countries say, there should be some overall control and transparency in the negotiations for all participants.

Also, unlike the U.S., the EEC has now been insisting that the GNG should have a central role and exercise overall supervision on individual negotiating groups.

The procedural decisions Monday provide that the GNG would meet on November 18, and as necessary thereafter, to fulfil its mandate of designating the surveillance mechanism, so that the TNC could decide on this, as a matter of priority, not later than December 16, 1986.

Participants said the intention is to hold consultations to agree on the mechanism and its terms of reference, and its relationship to the TNC as well as to the GNG.

As regards the negotiating plans, it was also agreed that each of the subjects for negotiations in goods, listed in the Punta del Este declaration, would have a negotiating group, except where the GNG agreed to combine more than one subject in one negotiating group.

Participants said this formulation was intended to ensure the setting up of a separate negotiating group on textiles and clothing, without saying so, as also on the two issues of trade-related investment and intellectual property (where the us has been seeking separate negotiating groups).

Several participants reportedly spoke at the meeting Monday to make this clear.

It was also agreed Monday that the GNG in due course might decide on inclusion of additional subject matters in the negotiations, giving due consideration to the statement made by the chairman of the Punta del Este meeting prior to the adoption of the ministerial declaration.

The chairman had then said a consensus to negotiate could not be reached at that time on a number of issues, avid these issues included export of hazardous substances, commodity arrangements. Restrictive business practices and workers right.

The proposals for detailed negotiating plans, the GNG agreed Monday, would cover a provisional calendar and timetable for the principal stages of the negotiating process in each subject area, focussing in particular on the initial stages.

The principal stages would include the identification of matters falling within each subject area, the preparation of an adequate factual basis for the negotiations, agreement on procedures and techniques for the negotiations, tabling of specific texts or offers and negotiations on the basis of such texts or offers, and finally the achievement of a result acceptable to participants.

A number of working groups, to meet on specified dates, to develop proposals for negotiating plan in each subject were named by the GNG, with the stipulation that the grouping of subjects was provisional (and did not imply the setting up of negotiating groups on the same basis).

The GNG itself it was agreed would meet on December 5 and December 16 to carry out its mandate to organise the negotiations.

The TNC, it was recommended, should meet on December 16, receive a report from the GNG and decide on the appropriate surveillance mechanism for standstill and rollback, including periodic reviews and evaluations.

The GNG is reported to have discussed Monday, without taking any decisions, the issue of granting observer status to international organisations.

The GNG was informed that the IMF, UNCTAD and SELA (the Latin American Regional Organisation) have sought such status, as also World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) in respect of the negotiations on intellectual property rights.

While some participants are reported to have favoured the door being kept open for other intergovernmental organisations, others like the EEC wanted such status granted only to organisations with the widest possible mandate and membership, and not to all regional bodies'.

Brazil is reported to have sad that some of the criteria being developed in GATT on grant of observer status should be used declared competence of organisation in trade policy matters, the number of GATT CPS who are members of the organisation, and the reciprocity that GATT enjoys in meetings of such organisations.