7:52 AM Apr 24, 1997

WTO SETS UP WORKING GROUPS ON NEW ISSUES

Geneva, 24 April (TWN) -- The General Council of the World Trade Organization formally constituted three working groups to study issues relating to trade and investment, trade and competition policy, and transparency in government procurement.

By their Declaration adopted in December 1996, at the first Ministerial Conference (December 1996) of the World Trade Organization, the Ministers agreed to establish these three working groups.

The Council named Thursday Amb. Krirk-Krai Jirapaet of Thailand to head the working group on trade and investment, and Frederick Yves Jenny of France to chair the working group on trade and competition policy.

The Ambassador of Venezuela, Mr. Werner Porfirio Corrales Leal is to head the working group on transparency in government procurement practices.

Mr. Jenny, a French academic and Professor of Economics at ESSEC, is the author of several books and articles on competition questions, and since 1994 is Chairman of the OECD Committee in Competition Law and Policy.

The working groups on trade and investment and trade and competition policy are to study these questions, "on the understanding that this is without prejudice to whether negotiations are to be initiated in the future in the World Trade Organization."

The working group on transparency in government procurement practices is to develop elements for inclusion in an appropriate agreement.

Given the considerable controversies that preceded the discussions at Singapore on these, and the compromises involved in the language of the declaration, in effect the Council in setting the working groups and their Chairmen, did not spell out any detailed terms of reference and thus mandated to proceed on the basis of the respective wordings of the declaration.

Any issues relating to the detailed work programme or terms of reference or issues to be covered are expected to be brought up in the working groups.

The Singapore declaration provided a common chapeau for the working groups on trade and investment and trade and competition policy, in setting out a frame for the work of the two.

It said: "Having regard to the existing WTO provisions on matters related to investment and competition policy and the built-in agenda in these areas, including the TRIMs Agreement, and on the understanding that the work undertaken shall not prejudge whether negotiations will be initiated in the future, we also agree to:

* establish a working group to examine the relationship between trade and investment, and

* establish a working group to study issues raised by Members relating to the interaction between trade and competition policy, including anti-competitive practices, in order to identify any areas that may merit further consideration in the WTO framework."

The working group on trade and competition has been specifically directed to study "issues raised by members" on the interaction between trade and competition policy" and thus brings within its ambit issues of not only the competitive framework and policies and laws of members, but also questions of Restrictive Business Practices of private parties (the transnational corporations) in international trade as well as use and misuse of anti-dumping and other instruments to protect domestic markets and prevent competition.

But the United States and the European Union (which originally raised the competition policy question for the Singapore meeting agenda), in press conferences after the meeting said they were agreed that anti-dumping and other such issues should not be covered. The EU has said that it would be "too ambitious" to take on the entire RBPs question (despite the fact of the existence of a voluntary guidelines in the UNCTAD RBP code of 1979 or "The Set").

The Ministers also directed these two groups to "draw upon each other's work if necessary and also draw upon and be without prejudice to the work in UNCTAD and other appropriate intergovernmental fora."

They added "As regards UNCTAD, we welcome the work under way as provided for in the Midrand Declaration and the contribution it can make to the understanding of issues. In the conduct of the work of the working groups, we encourage cooperation with the above organizations to make the best use of available resources and to ensure that the development dimension is fully taken into account."

The WTO General Council was also directed to keep the work of each body under review, and will determine after two years how the work of each body should proceed.

"It is clearly understood that future negotiations, if any, regarding multilateral disciplines in these areas, will take place only after an explicit consensus decision is taken among WTO Members regarding such negotiations."

On the government procurement issue, the Ministers agreed at Singapore:

* to establish a working group to conduct a study on transparency in government procurement practices, taking into account national policies, and, based on this study, to develop elements for inclusion in an appropriate agreement.

By bringing up new issues through the "trade and..." formula, instead of the Uruguay Round formula of "Trade-related...", the US, EC and Japan are clearly aiming (at the negotiating stage) to create new rules to put developing countries into a strait-jacket of neo-liberalism, and change some of the already existing rules of the WTO in favour of the economic activities of their corporations - without having to undertake the more difficult job of amendments.

This trade experts and observers of the Third World feel could be prevented only by active engagement of the developing country-delegates (most of whom, including active delegations, have only one or two bodies to field) and thus often find their case go by default.

To safeguard against work being undertaken behind their back, they put in at Singapore some restrictions on the frequency and simultaneity of meetings.

In terms of organizing the work of these groups, the Ministers directed careful attention by given to minimizing the burden on delegations, especially those with more limited resources, and to coordinate meetings with those of relevant UNCTAD bodies.

But while this is intended to limit the number of meetings (having regard to other intergovernmental activities, both at WTO and the UNOG) and their being held simultaneously, and the dominant countries driving these agendas, and the WTO secretariat which mostly functions to promote their interests, have the penchant to get around these limitations by the Chairmen holding 'informal' consultations, and informal informals, that also help non-transparent decision-making.